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The developments in Ukraine in 2014, namely the annexation of 
Crimea and the secessionist upheaval in Donetsk and Lugansk areas 
caused — or appeared as the content of — a rift between the “West” 
and Russia. The core questions of this article explore the nature of 
this rift and its significance on the shape of the international system 
in their relatedness to the Ukrainian crisis. 
The concepts employed in the study belong to phenomenology as 
adapted to the field of international relations, in order to answer to 
the apparent need to develop a tool that would enable us to ground 
the study on its subjective/intersubjective infrastructure that is 
adequate to the nature of the concepts of state, territory, international 
system and relations. 
Within this framework, the Ukrainian crisis and Crimean annexation 
appear as a positional and systemic content that marks a new 
temporal phase of the post-bipolar intersubjectivity. An existential 
framework shall thus be provided to policy contents, as a posteriori 
yet “real” elements of the phenomena which may be extended, on 
subjective/intersubjective grounds of international relations, 
towards positional and systemic horizons as defining and restraining 
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Introduction
Secessionist movements that evolved into frozen conflicts 
have constituted a particular phenomenon related to the ex-
USSR countries during the post-bipolar era. The distinguishing 
factor of those conflicts from the others throughout the globe 
is that they almost invariably posited fault lines on a larger 
scale, involving clear reciprocal position-takings among the 
ex-opponents of the Cold War era. They arose in countries that 
had shown a tendency to change alignment – which would 
have a meaning only on retention of the bipolar period, with 
the opposition’s stance against that change along with its 
original agenda (on the latter point, see Souleimanov 2013). 
These movements generally succeeded in securing territory 
and found support on a logic inherited from bipolarity/
bipolarisation. The government that had to face the secessionist 
movement and de facto lost territory, in its turn, was supported 
to varying degrees and forms by the ex-opposing camp on the 
same logic (see Coyle 20181). These include Transnistria (Jackson 
2003: 81-111, Kennedy 2016), Abkhazia (Jackson 2003: 112-139), 
South Ossetia (Lemay-Hebert 2008), and Lugansk-Donetsk cases, 
while Nagorno-Karabakh presents some differences due to the 
nature and the sides of the conflict (Vaserman, Ginat 1994, 
Souleimanov 2013). 
The importance of these conflicts, beyond their fundamental 
causes and outcomes, resides on their implications on the 
international system structure. They constitute spatial 
dividing lines that transcend their scale. As such, they 
become the contents of a more encompassing, systemic level 
contradiction. Their “freeze” further underlines this situation, 
contributing to the durability of the systemic level differences, 
while themselves gaining durability from the same source.
However, their being “frozen” also ensures that their systemic-
level consequences are contained. They are, in large part, re-
confined to the countries they occur in with secessionist entities 
gaining at least a de facto status of counterpart. Furthermore, 
their resolution is locked to some internal/international 
process or a soft balancing action, and the involvement 
level/escalation potential of their supporting actors is thus 
restrained. With the freeze of the conflict, the sides involved 
1 Coyle’s fairly recent work gives a good account of the frozen conflicts, including their 
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may preserve their position. Consequently, the systemic-level 
supporters gain a margin of manoeuvre to circumvent the 
conflict in their relations, while they also preserve their stance 
regarding the conflict. 
The Crimean part of the Ukrainian crisis seems to differ from 
this general picture. It is the first time since the end of the 
bipolar/bipolarised era that a significant power incorporated 
part of the territory of an independent – and westward shifting 
– country. The Crimean crisis shows a novelty in terms of 
engagement of one exogenous side of such conflicts in that 
particular political geography. The annexation of the Peninsula, 
notwithstanding the international law debate on the matter, 
created serious and possibly systemic repercussions. 
In this paper, the crisis, and its implications for the involved 
actors and the international system shall be examined through 
the employment of the concepts and methods belonging to 
phenomenology. The first chapter shall be reserved to outline 
those concepts and the reasons for their use. The phenomenon 
is to be studied concerning its link with the actors’ positions 
and their systemic references that transcend the causal 
factors while positing their framework. The aim is to handle 
the phenomenon on a subjective/intersubjective ground 
adequate to the nature of the very concepts of territory, state, 
international politics and international system and to develop 
an explanatory tool that would complement causal studies and 
their theoretical approaches generally based on objectivisation 
of phenomena. 
In the second chapter, we shall concentrate our attention on 
the systemic temporality of the post-bipolar/unipolar era, its 
constituent actors and Ukraine in its positional temporality 
within. We will meditate upon the constant reference of noetic-
noematic processes to the intersubjective constitution of the 
international system and its encompassing presence in the 
constitution of the Ukrainian state of affairs. 
In the third chapter, we shall examine the subjective/
intersubjective infrastructure of the Ukrainian/Crimean crisis 
within our conceptual framework. There we will try to show 
how the Crimean annexation constituted a content that marked 
the passage to a new phase of post-bipolar/unipolar systemic 
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of the system. The characteristics of the new phase shall be 
described accordingly, departing from the single phenomenon 
of Crimea towards the intersubjective system.
Subjective/Intersubjective Grounds of International Relations 
and the employment of the concepts of Phenomenology
Subjective/Intersubjective infrastructure of International Relations
The study of international relations with all its diversity as 
to the conceptualisation, approaches and methods, has a 
fundamental point of departure. It assumes the existence of 
state, territory, international relations themselves, even an 
international system, before dissecting them. The assumption is 
neither inherently negative nor invalid. Moreover, eliminating 
assumption from experiences, acts and thought processes is 
neither necessary nor possible for it would posit solus ipse (but 
see Ricoeur 2005 and Gander 2017: 138 for the solus ipse problem 
related to ego-cogito) depriving the subject of objects and the 
directionality of any thought. Assumption of the existence of 
things constitutes, therefore, the fundamental noetic-noematic 
act that establishes the connection of ego-cogito (see Husserl 
1982: 7-19; 25-26 for ego-cogito’s separate presence, Husserl 1983: 
5-6) to reality2. Therefore, the assumption in its pure form as the 
act is inherently valid. In contrast, the validity of the “assumed” 
as the object of predication/judgment is a posteriori to it (see 
Husserl 1982: 10-11; Husserl 1983: 105-107), another noetic-
noematic process (see Husserl 1983: 58-60, Foellesdal 2005 
(1969)) with varying modalities. It is the “natural attitude” in 
Husserlian terms, the natural state of existence where thought, 
experience, and judgmental/predicative acts relate the subject 
to the reality through the fundamental assumption and render 
the subject a part of the assumed reality (see Husserl 1983: 51-57)
The second, a posteriori part of this fundamental act becomes 
problematic when the assumed thing has no correspondence 
in immediately accessible reality. The assumption, in this 
case, appears “empty” at first sight yet its noematic correlate 
is posited, nevertheless. In a particular field of study where 
predication, judgment and theorisation are not only present 
2 Being put in perspective through the universal epoche, by the suspension of the 
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but employed in building further causal structures, not 
only on the fundamental act of assumption but also on the 
“assumed” that does not correspond to immediate reality, the 
reality as accessed becomes hybrid. It does not translate into 
invalidity either but alters and expands the reality to which 
its validity is related. Here, the assumed is incorporated into 
causality through the intersubjectivity of the assumption. In 
other words, by rendering an intersubjective constitution to a 
part of the causal interactions within the reality, the validity 
of the assumed is secured in an altered environment, more 
intersubjective than objective. The reality becomes itself 
intersubjectively constituted (Schnell 2010). The natural 
attitude is thus rooted in a subjective/intersubjective ground. 
The problem arises from that point on and is in no case 
related to the validity of the reality thus expanded. Natural 
attitude, when related to international relations, pursues 
another noetic-noematic act that is the objectivisation 
of the expanded reality through the assumed. The act of 
objectivisation runs in the reverse direction of assumption in 
relation to its subjective/intersubjective ground. The assumed 
is either overlooked as assumed and is dealt with as if it was 
a directly accessible part of the reality, or is “explained” within 
causality through theorisation belonging to natural attitude 
(see Husserl 1983: 7-18;35-39;45-48, Husserl 1970: 48-53), such as 
psychology, sociology and derivatives. Such a causal study does 
not suffer from invalidity either. Nevertheless, it is restrained 
by denaturing the assumed content as well as the expansion 
of reality. Its validity does not encompass the subjective/
intersubjective ground of phenomena. 
The consequence is to overlook the noetic-noematic processes 
that do not only provide the phenomena with their existential 
ground but also the framework they impose on causal 
interactions involving purely constituted elements. To begin 
with, the objectivisation of the state as an actor of international 
relations, which is equivalent to cutting the link between the 
assumed and the mechanism of assumption with all that 
it attributes to the assumed, releases the causal parameters 
from their existential framework. In a secondary effort of 
theorisation within causality, the study of the actor and its 
interactions becomes possible, however, through the priorities 
and methods pertaining to a reduced object in a reduced 
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intersubjective infrastructure when its validity should be 
assessed on that background.
Therefore, the study of the subjective/intersubjective 
infrastructure becomes necessary in order to complement 
the study restrained to causality. Hence the need for a 
phenomenological approach to the reality in its expanded 
form, to the subjects and phenomena related to its expansion. 
It would aim at establishing a link with the intersubjective 
infrastructure and develop an explanatory tool for the 
existentially regulating framework of the constituted actors, 
phenomena, and interactions within reality (see Husserl 1970: 
143-148). That study, as mentioned, is not to replace but to 
complement the existing approaches.
Within this framework, the natural attitude, the prevalence 
of which is the reason for imposing objectivisation, is to be 
suspended. Epoche does not ignore or attempt to erase the 
elements of reality. It is the bracketing of the natural attitude 
and its contents with the fundamental act of assumption 
(Husserl 1982: 7-9, Husserl 1983: 67-69)3. It is, therefore, a change 
of attitude in relation to what is being “assumed”. It thus 
becomes possible to clarify the nature of the phenomenon as 
a phenomenon, noetic-noematic acts as such, and contents as 
contents. The phenomenological reduction does not carry us 
to solus ipse either. It carries us instead to the sphere of noetic-
noematic processes pertaining to the constitution of reality as 
well as that of the subject as part of it, where intersubjectivity 
is not assumed but pre-given (see Gander 2017: 94-964, Heidegger 
1996: 117-1185; Husserl 1970: 184-186). Through epoche, it 
becomes possible to reach to the actor as position among the 
multitude of actors in-position within the systemic framework 
co-constituted as shaped intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is 
attributed with a shape on its being itself a noematic correlate, 
with its noematic core and strata. If the noematic strata 
depend instead on the modalities of related noetic-noematic 
processes of individual actors, the noematic core to which they 
refer must be uniform. The uniformity is not only due to the 
3 In Cartesian Meditations for the “Cartesian overthrow” and in Ideen I concerning the 
need for a firm axiomatic ground as ego-cogito through universal epoche. 
4 Gander’s reference to Riedel’s dialogic approach to cogito that leads to pre-givenness 
of intersubjectivity through that of the other in the language is something we would 
disagree with, given that the language itself is not pre-given. 
5 Heidegger’s reasoning concerning the Mitdasein as the basis of the possibility of 
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pre-givenness of intersubjectivity but also to its simplified 
nature since it is itself “derived” as its constituent subjects 
are “derived”, themselves constituted (see Carr 1987: 267/ 281-
2996). Intersubjectivity’s shape as noematic core is nothing but 
a standard reference among the actors where the secondary 
attributions as strata are also bracketed. The example is as 
follows. Unipolarity, as a noematic core, stands unbracketed, 
while the general attitude of the actor towards unipolarity, 
including secondary modalities that produce predicative or 
judgmental contents, is suspended. Those suspended are to be 
incorporated into the study, within the framework stemming 
from the subjective/intersubjective infrastructure that 
becomes reachable through epoche.
Lastly, it needs underlining here that the phenomenological 
approach to IR is fundamentally different from constructivist 
or post-structuralist ones. Epoche is neither abstraction nor 
deconstruction. Subjective/intersubjective infrastructure 
does neither equal narration as act nor is constructed by 
a narrator-group that would define things and situations 
in their Weltanschauung at that level. Any Weltanschauung 
is “constituted”. The said does not deny the existence of a 
narrative and a narrator. However, they are necessarily a 
posteriori, and they make part of our investigation as contents, 
not within the noetic-noematic processes of (intersubjectively 
attributed to) the derived-subject. They are posited through 
the objectivisation and shape the reality on the pre-present 
intersubjective infrastructure. They are not by nature different 
than social/psychological research conducted through the 
same objectivisation of the subjective/intersubjective field and 
the act of constitution. De facto and frequently, they restrain 
themselves within the hybrid-causality by attributing the 
act of constitution to social strata, especially the elites. They 
prefer, therefore, to depart from the “constituted” to reach the 
“constituted” in terms of meaning attribution. The same is 
valid for the language as well. It is also a posteriori to the act 
of meaning attribution as the formulation and expression of 
forms and contents. The subjectivity/intersubjectivity of these 
works thus become not only “posited” itself, but also reduced 
to forms, as a simulacrum of subjectivity in an objectivised 
environment. Therefore, they are themselves a posteriori 
to the fundamental act of assumption, only returning to 
6 On the constitution of We-subject as a simulacrum of ego-cogito (cogitamus ergo sumus), 
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the “assumed” in a critical sense within the hybrid-reality. In 
short, they operate within the natural attitude, and despite the 
similarities with our work, at first sight, they indeed have nothing 
in common with it.  
Temporality
Until now, the study on the subjective/intersubjective 
infrastructure and the establishment of a link with the 
constitution of reality has instead been described as resembling 
taking a picture of international relations. Time here is the 
missing dimension. All noetic-noematic processes are temporal 
acts that ensure the necessary continuity of the actor and the 
system even when they appear inert. The temporality of the actor 
and the system constitutes, beyond an object of study of our 
phenomenological approach, a fundamental component of it that 
makes the study possible. 
In this context, two forms of temporality shall be considered. 
The first is the temporal act of retention-protention (see Carr 
1991: 24, 40-45; Husserl 1964: 39-50). It is the constitution of 
“now” with related contents (see Olbromski 2007). The actor as 
a derived subject must always retain itself as position, its acts, 
and experiences and the intersubjectivity as the environment 
with all “bracketed” contents. Thus, it is not “a remembrance of 
the past” but the fundamental continuation mechanism of the 
self and the intersubjective environment. In other words, it is 
the permanent constitution of the self that appresents the rest. 
The recollection of particular events and situations may not be 
classified separately from retention (but see Carr 1991: 21-27)7. 
What is recollected in an intentional act sends part of this study 
as long as it is incorporated by the same act, into the retention. 
As for the protention, it is to be defined as the continuity — act of 
retention, its extension into the near future in what is retained, 
assuring the permanent constitution of “now”. “Now” may not be 
posited without retention and protention, for it does not exist as a 
given moment. It is posited as continually vanishing, and it gains 
existence only in extension backwards and forwards. Retention-
protention, as a fundamental temporal act of the subject, is also 
7 We would disagree with Carr and Husserl on the separation of the recollection from the 
retention. Recollection would be valid only as retentional content as transformed into 
it. For the derived-subject, there is even no need for “transformation”, for the recollection 
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the primary mode of all noetic-noematic processes (see also 
Husserl 1964: 87). 
The second temporal form in our study is anticipation. It 
includes the noetic-noematic processes related to the actor 
and the system, with all modalities and contents, in future in 
general. Its distinction from retention-protention is its non-
linearity. Anticipation is positing on a horizon on which the actor, 
system and contents are to take the substance in such-and-such 
form. Through epoche, the unbracketed act appears as multiple-
ended. It is not a causal process involving probabilities. On the 
contrary, causal interaction elements are either bracketed or 
not attributed, depending on the conduct of the mere study. 
Still, the horizon as posited is neither amorphous nor infinite. 
It posits a framework stemming from retention-protention not 
only of actor’s position and its modalities but also that of the 
ever-present systemic reference due to the constant positing 
of the intersubjective environment (see Heidegger 1996: 97-100; 
and Marion 1998: 77-97)8. Therefore, the anticipation’s horizon is 
the framework of contents and forms to be attributed, in the form 
of foreign policy acts, including predicative and judgmental 
ones. Study of anticipation through epoche gives the regulating/
restraining intersubjective horizon of causality, to which the 
bracketed contents belong and where they are formed.  
Our approach thus involves the study of the temporality of 
the actor and the system. Consequently, the noetic-noematic 
processes of the subject are to be stressed by the term positioning 
as their temporal form. Notable as well is its link with the 
position to be defined in contents within the causality. 
Contents within their noetic-noematic framework
We defined the phenomenological attitude as complementary 
to the existing studies, which are valid yet restrained to the 
study of the contents through objectivisation of the elements of 
the subjective/intersubjective infrastructure. The coexistence 
of natural and phenomenological attitude is imperative in this 
context. The omission of the natural attitude is equivalent to 
8  Anticipation is, therefore, the temporal expression of the radicalisation of 
intentionality as the opening of ego-cogito to its object, on a fusion of itself with it, on 
a horizon. It should be thought as a temporal de-distancing in Heideggerian terms, the 
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suppressing the contents of the study. Likewise, the omission 
of the phenomenological attitude is equivalent to erasing 
the subjective-intersubjective framework and dynamics. 
Therefore, the conduct of the study shall alternate between the 
two attitudes to define both and fit them together. Epoche is to 
constitute the link between the two. 
The positional temporality of the actor(s) involved and 
the systemic temporality on the standard reference to the 
intersubjective environment are to be defined when studying 
a specific phenomenon as to its framework of the constitution. 
The contents related to the phenomenon thus will be set into 
the framework posited through this subjective/intersubjective 
framework. Without prejudice to the causal content of the 
phenomenon, the link with its subjective/intersubjective 
infrastructure is to be established. The assessment thus 
becomes possible for the causal contents as well as for the 
noetic-noematic modalities of positing through each other. 
Constitution of the unipolarity and Ukrainian positioning 
The systemic temporality of the early Post-Bipolar era
We should begin with a clarification on our employment of the 
terms pertaining to “polarity” which belong to the structural 
realist approaches. Polarity terminology and the underlying 
line of thought have been criticised as to their adequacy and 
even validity in-depth, through ample argumentation related 
to their very own context, parameters, and assumptions (see 
especially the 11 points of Gardner 2019: 39-60). Their presence in 
our work, as shall be seen, is out-of-context. Polarity terminology 
gains adequacy in our work in its quality to express the co-
reference to the intersubjective environment in temporal 
shaping of positioning and positions of the actors. Otherwise, 
our position had been made clear in the first chapter.
Bipolarity/bipolarisation may be defined through epoche that 
would suspend the contents that are attributed to it, like the 
causal parameters of the distribution of power and its various 
forms and criteria (Waltz 1979: 161-193, De Keersmaeker 2018: 
16-21, Wagner 1993), as well as issues of behavioural patterns 
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systemic reference to a central duality as noematic core of the 
intersubjective environment of the actors.  
Systemic reference as the noematic core of intersubjectivity’s 
constitution posits the fundamental directionality of the 
actors in relation to the intersubjective environment. In 
that sense, bipolarity’s central duality becomes a priori to 
its contents in its duration, even if its roots may arguably be 
purely causal. The bipolarity is first established as the basic 
shape of the intersubjective environment. It then transcends 
effectively the causal criteria formulated/observed a posteriori 
through objectivisation. For example, the distribution of power 
within the system as the choice spectrum of data becomes itself 
arguable as valid criteria of explaining bipolarity; however, the 
bipolar reference remains intact. In other words, the system’s 
bipolar/bipolarised noematic core influences even how the 
causal data are selected and interpreted. 
On the other hand, bipolarity as the systemic reference – despite 
its evolution in its duration – remains valid as long as the central 
duality remains intact. The disintegration of the USSR is not, in 
this sense, the end of bipolarity. There is, namely, the sudden 
alteration of the distribution of power – which is a posteriori 
and not truly determining due to the nature of the bipolar 
distribution of power. It would not be wholly incorrect to state 
that the ultimate balance between the two poles resided on the 
nuclear equilibrium especially during the late phase of bipolarity, 
which remained intact9- but because of the intersubjective 
experience of invalidation of the central duality itself. 
The end of the central duality to which the system’s actors 
referred in their positioning marks the end of bipolarity. 
Nevertheless, what is the subjective/intersubjective meaning of 
the “end”? On suspension of simple causal interaction, we have 
a change of modality in subject’s relatedness to a phenomenon, 
which is the transition from “affirmation” to “invalidation”, 
effectively a change of “sign” related to the otherwise intact 
phenomenon. The bipolar reference’s invalidation, in its turn, 
gives us only an invalidated phenomenon and not imperatively 
its suppression. The suppression of a fundamental reference as 
if it did not exist (or more correctly, its total transfer into the 
9 It is certainly true that a post-Soviet economic collapse occurred (Tsygankov 2016: 86 
- gives a succinct description). However, in no moment, the fundamental balance of 
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sphere of “recollection”) is existentially impracticable. That 
would mean the suppression of retention itself, of the actor’s 
positioning, as well as of the systemic reference. That would, 
therefore, mean the suppression of the “now” in its constitution 
for the system and the actor. 
Therefore, even after its change must the systemic reference be 
retained on that altered modality. As for the actors’ positional 
temporality, the alteration imposes a change according to 
that of a systemic reference. In that sense, the actor retains 
its position on the alteration of that of the systemic reference, 
preserving it through different modalities (Bogdanov 201710).
Concerning the poles themselves, the bipolar era was 
undoubtedly characterised by the fusion of their positional 
temporalities with the systemic temporality even beyond the 
systemic reference within their noetic-noematic processes. 
Their positional temporalities were not shaped in reference to 
the system. Instead, the system was a priori constituted through 
their positions.  
Consequently, the retention of the position of the “intact” pole 
on the alteration of the systemic reference engendered the 
“unipolar moment” (Krauthammer 1991) even without the 
experience of the change in power distribution. In other words, 
in terms of systemic reference, a priori to the actual contents that 
follow, the invalidation of bipolarity as retained equated the 
unipolarity (see for various definitions on power-distribution 
and behavioural patterns with consequent predications/
judgements that may be reduced to that point, Jervis 2009, 
Huntington 1999, Ikenberry, Mastanduno, Wohlforth 2011, 
Finnemore 2011, Monteiro 2014: 40-41, Beckley 2018: 100-113). 
For the intact pole and the actors positioned in proximity to it, 
there were no position-altering influences due to the change 
in the systemic reference. The brief history of the unipolarity 
may phenomenologically be reduced to the fact that the “intact” 
side continued with its bipolar-position as retained other than 
discourse appropriate to the new state of affairs.  
For the Russian Federation, which was entirely automatically 
referred to as the successor of the USSR, the retention of the 
10 Bogdanov stresses, indirectly, this fundamental retention in his chapter; however 
within the “objectivised” field of the IR and recommends a compromise/clarification of 









XXVI (86) 2020, 
42-70
systemic reference was no different in substance, but on a 
relevant change of modalities. The self-retention of the actor on 
the invalidation of the systemic reference produced a different 
sort of position within the unipolar moment that evolved 
within the systemic temporality. Unipolarity’s formative 
phase, if translated into a positional adaptation based on 
continuity for the US, became for the Russian Federation its 
transformation into something else (see Tsygankov 2016: 59-
9611). The fundamental policy papers of the Russian Federation 
at that time, even during Tsygankov’s “liberal Westernist” 
period manifest that, in the form of promoting the end of a 
bipolar era (for the West) while retaining a bipolar-like position 
for Russia in that very “promotion” (Melville, Shakhleina 2005)12. 
This coincides well with other policy contents, especially with 
the frozen conflicts in the “near-abroad” and limited rallying 
attempts of the ex-USSR geography in a loose and mostly 
inefficient arrangement under the CIS (see Kobrinskaya 2007).
For Ukraine and the other new independencies, the formation 
of their positional temporalities was more complicated. 
Their retention of the USSR had to be radically different from 
that of the Russian Federation. They were posited by the 
dismemberment, instead of being dismembered. The said does 
not imperatively engender antagonism with what is retained 
as a modality of their positioning; however, they accommodate 
more easily with the unipolar moment as systemic reference. 
Moreover, their positional horizon was inherently broader 
than that of the Russian Federation since they did not retain a 
position of the pole – even on invalidation. Still, the retention 
of the USSR was necessarily there, not as a systemic reference but 
as positional contents towards Russia. From there emanated 
the existential conflict potential that led to frozen conflicts and 
beyond. 
11 It is interesting to see that the same subjective/intersubjective reference produced, 
within the Russian positional temporality, different contents arguably evolving 
towards adequacy in the experience of the intact retention of the bipolar-self for the 
US and the “West” as “unipolar acts”. Tsygankov depicts the earliest as post-bipolar 
euphoria and liberal Westernism for Russia. 
12 See for the early foreign policy, national security concepts and military doctrine 
papers from 1993 to 2000. The main elements related to the system include “the end” 
of bipolarity, concern over the US possible unipolar attitude, the need for and tendency 
towards a multicentred/multipolar world order, the primacy of the UN – and the OSCE 
– and the place of Russia as a great power, in a de facto bipolar position in relation to the 
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Ukraine’s becoming content of Russian and Western positions 
within the systemic temporality
Constituting itself in a position w ithin the altered 
intersubjectivity has perhaps been more controversial for 
Ukraine than all the other new independencies. The Ukrainian 
“We-subject (see Carr 1991: 122-127)” was constituted on an 
immanent contradiction. The country was divided between 
– mainly – Ukrainian and Russian affiliations based on 
linguistic separations rather than declared ethnicity13 and in 
potentially pro-western and pro-Russian factions susceptible 
to create pulls in opposite directions in Ukrainian positioning, 
depending on the state of Russian-Western relations which 
equated systemic reference.
The derived-subject/actor is constituted primordially as a 
spatial being with a far better-defined space than ego-cogito, to 
the point that spatiality equates Leib (see Husserl 1982: 108-112)14. 
Now, what if the Leib or the self-experience of Leib is inherently 
incoherent, incoherence itself being a core phenomenon of the 
subject’s position? For Ukraine what was spatially coherent was 
the inner division and not the outer “posture”, factions being 
accumulated in different parts of the country (see O’Loughlin, 
Toal and Kolosov 2017 for an insightful paper on the concept 
of Russkiy Mir in the geography). Pro-Russian (or only Russian) 
parts were in proximity with Russia as the surveys, elections 
and then the crisis would demonstrate. 
For Crimea, Russian affiliation on ethnic15 and especially 
linguistic16 bases was absolute. Crimea became Ukrainian 
territory admittedly due to a strange rectification of (inner) 
borders during Khrushchev’s era (Gardner 2015: 43-44). It would 
not be wrong to say that the Peninsula became the prominent 
content of the inherent incoherence of Ukraine’s positioning 
within the system. It is to be remembered that the Peninsular 
Parliament declared independence from Ukraine as early as in 
1992, although it was not implemented (Bebler 2015). Crimean 
13 http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/ [accessed 22 April 2020].
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/ [accessed 22 April 2020].
14 The equivalent of position for the derived-subject is the term Leib for ego-cogito on 
the real/causal plane as the primary mode of the subject that gives itself in experience 
appresenting a monad, or in more general terms in our study, subjecthood.
15 http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/  [accessed 22 April 2020].
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Constitution was adopted six years later. The autonomy was 
weak. Crimean Parliament had no competence to adopt laws. 
The language issue was more or less hanging in the air, and 
the “rising Ukrainian nationalism” undoubtedly irritated 
the Crimean population as it did in the southern and eastern 
regions of the country (Wydra 2014). In addition to Crimea, the 
census figures for Donetsk17 and Lugansk18 were of the same 
nature.
At that stage, it would be correct to stress that the existential 
uniqueness/erratic positional temporality of Ukraine resulted 
in its being bound almost entirely to the systemic temporality. 
Ukraine was not placed in the Russian near abroad similarly to 
Belarus, nor was able to constitute itself in line with “western 
bloc” as Poland or the Baltic states. Consequently, the incoherence 
was the modality of Ukrainian positioning within the system. 
That has been, therefore, the main existential particularity of 
Ukraine that defined the others’ positioning regarding her. 
The incoherence might have been sterile if it was not related 
to altered systemic reference within its temporality. It did not 
immediately become “fertile” either during the early phase of 
unipolarity. Although the Western and Russian positions were 
substantially diversifying as regards their modalities related 
to the altered systemic reference, dividing lines were not fully 
formed. 
The earlier wave of NATO enlargement19 and the EU expansion 
more or less parallel to the former, the Kosovo crisis of 1999 
and the Second Iraqi War that followed in 2003 (Zacklin 2010: 
91-154)20 constituted observable contents of passage into a new 
phase of the systemic temporality. Hence, Russian and Western 
modalities as regards the systemic reference (multipolarism 
versus and within unipolarity as different modalities of 
retention of the invalidated-bipolarity) became visibly more 
diversified. 
Even more important than those, due to their relatedness to 
“near-abroad”, colour revolutions and GUAM (Simon 2008: 93) 
17 http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/Donetsk/ [accessed 22 
April 2020].
18 http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/Luhansk/ [accessed 22 
April 2020].
19 The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
20 For the main argument of disregarding the UN Security Council (and Russian veto 
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constitute two critical developments that indicate the state 
of the unipolar moment within the systemic temporality, in 
addition to NATO enlargement of 2004 (Simon 2008: 102-103). 
They added contents to the positional and systemic rift between 
Russia and the West. The revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia 
were pro-western and consequently, at the current state of the 
systemic temporality, anti-Russian. Georgian revolution set the 
anti-Russian position far easier than Ukrainian one though, for 
the secession had already occurred there.
As for Ukraine, the Orange revolution (Coyle 2018: 42-46), while 
having changed the faction in power, neither substantially 
weakened the opposing one nor succeeded to transform its pro-
western inclination into a stable and robust position within 
the system.  The presidential elections in 2004, for example, 
among others, showed the spatial division and general balance 
spectacularly (Van der Pijl 2018: 38-41)21. Still, following the new 
wave of NATO enlargement of 2004, at the current stage of its 
erratic positioning, Ukraine initiated the “intensified dialogue” 
mechanism with NATO in 200522. Ukraine’s application for 
membership followed suit in 2008 and faced a hard-line 
Russian reaction by Putin at the NATO Bucharest Summit of the 
same year (Coyle 2018: 47-48). 
At that phase of systemic temporality as reflected on the 
reciprocal positions of Westerners and Russia, Ukraine’s 
becoming content of the evolving state of affairs is the result 
of its non-becoming a stable actor due to its fundamental 
incoherence of positioning. On the other hand, in contrast to 
Georgia or Moldova, this incoherence proved to be sustainable. 
Ukraine’s inner division, as we tried to outline in the previous 
section, was balanced. Both factions had about the same chance 
of acquiring power over the entire country, so separatism was 
not imminent. Moreover, in line with the actor’s becoming 
itself a content of the systemic-level positioning of the related 
actors, that balance was open to influences that would stem 
from or touch upon the reciprocal positions of Russia and the 
Westerners. In contrast to Georgian or Moldovan cases where 
positional temporality was stabilised by secession, in Ukraine, the 
21 See also Paniotto, Volodymyr, “Ukraine: Presidential Elections 2004 and the Orange 
Revolution.”  
https://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/articles/president%20election%20in%20
ukraine%202004.pdf  [accessed 22 April 2020].









XXVI (86) 2020, 
42-70
absence of such an inner imbalance held the country together 
and the position incoherent.
For the West, the enlargement of the Alliance, the EU and the 
promotion of “universal” values continued on the unipolar 
reference. On the other hand, Russian “fundamental papers” 
continued to be good indicators of a gradual multipolarist volte-
face on the same systemic reference23. The criticism of western 
normativism and universalism added to it increasingly 
(Chebankova 2017). The reflects on Ukraine as the content of 
reciprocal systemic positioning constituted the intersubjective 
inevitability of the crisis that gained content in 2014.
Crimea and the new phase of systemic temporality
Crisis and annexation
Ukrainian Crisis of 2014 occurred as the content of a newer 
phase of the unipolar systemic temporality. Western 
“unipolarism” was facing, at least since the Georgian Crisis 
of 2008, determined opposition from Russia, which included 
direct acts on the same systemic reference. Russian positional 
horizon was narrowed within the unipolar temporality 
as demonstrated by her direct intervention not only into 
a frozen conflict zone but also into the territory of a pro-
western government (Asmus 2010). On that instance, Georgia 
did not receive credible support from the West. Moreover, her 
NATO membership aspirations were de facto stalled (Kipiani 
2015). Finally, through the “reset period”, Georgian case was 
circumvented in Western-Russian relations. In other words, 
following an initial reaction, neither the US nor the EU truly 
countered Russian volte-face (Mikhelidze 2015).
Increased systemic pull on Ukraine made its position more 
fragile. Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership perspective was 
23 The “papers” highlighted the “policy of containment against Russia”, the threat 
assessment of NATO expansion, the “plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia” into 
the Alliance and attributing global functions to NATO in violation of international 
law. A European security treaty “from Vancouver to Vladivostok” was proposed as an 
alternative to “bloc-based approaches”. 
https://russiaeu.ru/userfiles/file/foreign_policy_concept_english.pdf [accessed 22 
April 2020]; https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf  
[accessed 22 April 2020]; 
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naturally an aim of the pro-western faction. However, there has 
been a general wavering of the public opinion on that matter 
in troubled times, such as the Kosovo conflict (Kalb 2015: 127). 
NATO and EU membership meant an irreversible engagement 
in providing the country with a western-anchored position 
that would appresent a rupture with Russia (Donaldson 2017). 
In parallel, “the protection of Russian communities abroad” 
gained strength in the Russian political discourse, extending 
to a broad interpretation of self-determination and of the 
western expansionism (linking the Kosovo example of self-
determination and humanitarian intervention with Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, as the precursor of Crimea in arguments, 
see Tuathail 2008, Nielsen 2009), further fuelling the internal 
division of Ukraine (Teper 2015)24.
On the political scene, the division did not allow a clear 
preponderance for one part over the other. Yanukovich won the 
2010 presidential election by a narrow margin over Timoshenko. 
The election results had the same geographical characteristics 
of 2004. Yanukovich had the advantage of the rift between the 
“Orange Revolution” leaders25 as a secondary balance-tipping 
factor. In the Peninsula, separatism – and joining Russia – 
was supported right after the Georgian War of 2008. Still, this 
support declined to a minority after Yanukovich’s access to 
power (Katchanovski 2015). Knott’s work related to identities in 
Crimea in the pre-annexation period offers further insight as to 
the fluctuations of the identity-related opinion by introducing 
more categories (Knott 2018).
Following Yanukovich’s access to power in 2010, the new 
government undid the pro-western acts of the former one, in 
conformity with the actor’s positional incoherence.  Ukrainian 
Parliament adopted a law guaranteeing the non-alignment of 
the country26. The same year President Yanukovich signed the 
Kharkiv Pact to prolong the lease of Sevastopol navy base – the 
main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet – to Russia until 2042 
(Gardner 2015: 63, Delanoe 2014, Van der Pijl 2018: 72). 
24 See also: “What Is Happening in Ukraine and What Kind of Future Awaits It?” Russian 
Social Science Review, 2017, 58:2-3, pp. 170-211 
25 Contributed by N. Kharchenko (Executive Director) and Vladimir Paniotto (Director 
General) Kyiv International Institute of Sociology “The Ukraine Presidential Election: 
Comparing the 2010 and 2004 Exit Polls” https://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/articles/
The%20Ukraine%20Presidential%20Election.pdf [accessed 22 April 2020].
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Another point of contradiction within this framework was the 
EU perspective for Ukraine and the new Russian-led Eurasian 
Union as an alternative (see Libman, Obydenkova 201827). The 
same regional contrast manifested itself for the support to EU 
and EAEU (Wydra 2014). 
Yanukovich government’s decisive moment seems to have 
been the non-conclusion of the EU Association Agreement in 
late 201328 (Mantovani, Rickenbacher 2014). Pro-western (or anti-
Russian) faction initiated Euromaidan. Yanukovich, after a 
losing struggle, left the country. A new administration accessed 
to power (Van der Pijl 2018: 69-86), appresenting-in-anticipation 
of the Ukrainian positioning EU over Eurasian Union, West 
and even indirectly NATO over Russia and a shrinking of the 
Russian positional horizon related to Ukraine and through 
Ukraine, in the systemic temporality.
Russian and pro-Russian reaction is well known. Crimea 
seceded and requested to join the Russian Federation. Russia 
intervened, and Ukrainian presence disappeared from Crimea 
and Sevastopol. Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, following 
a referendum in the Peninsula. The pro-Russian faction also 
seceded in Donetsk and Lugansk and with Russian support 
succeeded in maintaining their space (Kalb 2015: 158-179). 
Positional and systemic implications of the crisis 
Civil conflict and the annexation effectively put an end to 
Ukrainian incoherence which had constituted the noematic 
core of its position within the systemic temporality. Kyiv 
became an actor rather than a mere content, with the coherence 
gained from the secession. With Crimea and the pro-Russian 
provinces gone, Kyiv firmly and perhaps irreversibly anchored 
itself to the West, at least concerning its retention-protention 
and positional horizon. If Ukraine is unable to alter the current 
state of the Peninsula, its position equally may not be altered 
without force majeure. As contents appropriate to this clarified 
positioning, Ukraine signed the EU Association Agreement in 
2014, cancelled its non-alignment law and reinstated NATO 
27 On the EAEU as the content of Russian multipolarist positioning in near-abroad, with 
varying forms regarding the actor in question.
28 The text of the Agreement as signed in 2014 by the new government: http://trade.
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membership as a strategic foreign policy objective in 201729.
On the other hand, as a content related to the constitution of 
the system, it also became synonymous with the demarcation 
between the two different modalities of referencing the 
intersubjectivity, mainly due to the annexation, therefore 
Crimea, rather than the other secessionist entities which 
posited new frozen conflicts more or less similar to the 
precedents.  
Crimea’s importance resides at the meaning of annexation, 
rather than the strategic value of the Peninsula. By annexing 
and effectively militarizing the peninsula, Russia certainly 
gained a relatively advantageous position in the Black Sea at 
least at first sight. However, it is also correct that the Russian 
superiority is only meaningful in its relationship with its 
potential opponents, namely NATO countries. It depends rather 
on the presence of armaments, navy/anti-navy and air assets 
in the theatre and especially on the rigorous implementation 
of the Montreux regime which has been implemented most 
rigidly since its conclusion, denying the non-riparian allied 
navies meaningful access (in terms of tonnage and timespan) 
to the Black Sea30. 
The annexation marks a new phase in the systemic temporality 
which largely surpasses its concrete consequences. Russia at one 
side and the “West” on the other side are solidly engaged in their 
positional differences with Crimean content. Not the status of 
a region but the spatiality of a subject itself is being contested 
continuously within the systems’ intersubjectivity. Before the 
annexation, there were differences within the spatiality of an 
actor, defining its positioning on the engendered incoherence. 
Contested at that point was not even the spatiality-as-Leib 
of Ukraine but its position within the unipolar system. The 
annexation transferred the “problem” to Russia’s spatiality and 
heightened it to systemic level from the positional temporality 
of Ukraine. 
The annexation does not only crystallise in-system positioning 
of the two sides in relation with one another; it does not stay 
29 https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2017/06/09/ukraine-parliament-restores-
nato-membership-as-strategic-target/ [accessed 22 April 2020].
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local either.  It becomes part of the positional temporalities 
of the two sides as it refers to the intersubjective shape of 
unipolarity on rigidified and contradictory modalities. In Syria 
or even in Venezuela, the two sides face each other, or Russian-
Chinese relations gain momentum. For the latter, not only the 
bilateral cooperation but also the institutional cooperation, 
be it within the UN Security Council or at regional/continental 
level ones (SCO, even Belt and Road) become emphasised (see 
Feng and He 2017 for Chinese institutional conduct of its 
multipolarism).
As for Russian positional temporality, in contrast with Donetsk 
and Lugansk where the conflict has been “internationalised” 
with the OSCE special monitoring mission,31 the annexation of 
the Peninsula constituted an irreversible development. It could 
hypothetically be like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are 
just short of being formally annexed (see Ambrosio and Lange 
2016). On the other hand, within the systemic temporality, 
frozen conflicts did not resolve the question of western 
“unipolar” acts. As mentioned at the beginning, secessionist 
entities had to be supported continuously by Russia in order 
make them viable (see Gerrits, Bader 2016 for the afterwards 
of 2008 crisis in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, see German 
2016 for South Ossetian developments). Moreover, the actors 
who had to face secessionist movements invariably anchored 
their positions to the West. Russian positional horizon in its 
ancient geography continuously narrowed down with each 
conflict situation. Lastly, those frozen conflicts proved to be 
circumventable. Advantageous at face-value for Russia, they 
meant at the same time that no radical change in western 
positions would be necessary while maintaining the liability of 
secessionist entities for Russia. Phenomenologically, it was the 
positional equivalent of slow drowning for the Russian subject. 
Russian conduct during the Ukrainian crisis may thus be 
defined as a positional and progressively systemic remedy to 
this phenomenon. The Russian affiliation of the Peninsula 
and the arguable Kosovo-precedent provided convenient 
contents. As the success of Euromaidan already meant the loss 
of Ukraine, the annexation of the Peninsula became a possibly 
viable option. It imposed a dividing line that went beyond the 
almost inconsequential creation of frozen conflicts as regards 
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Western positioning. Crimea thus means, a priori to its contents, 
a systemic level position-taking engaging Russian position 
frontally to balance and narrow the western unipolarist horizon. 
Consequent momentum gain of the Russian pivot to the East 
– particularly the cooperation with China – constitutes a 
content appropriate to the new phase rather than a cause-effect 
relation with Western sanctions or a “choice” inherent to the 
objectivised reality (in contrast to Korolev’s reasoning on his 
correct analysis of contents – Korolev 2016 as well as in contrast 
to Lukin’s description as a “natural” development despite his 
stress on Russian and Chinese “polycentrist” convergence – 
Lukin 2018)  
The annexation was not recognised. Nevertheless, it showed 
anti-unipolarist (or multipolarist, stressing its difference from 
multipolar) positions within the system more clearly (Lewis 
2018)32:  For example, the contrast in BRICS’ attitude between 
Libyan and Ukrainian crises at the UN shows the prevalence 
of that systemic-level directionality over contents (see Brosig 
2019 81-86; 149-151). In fact, Crimea provided content to the 
divergences between several prominent actors as regards the 
modalities of systemic referencing, marking its new phase. 
As for the West, Crimea constitutes a unifying and diversifying 
content at the same time, depending on the actors’ modalities 
of referring to the new phase of the systemic temporality. 
Non-recognition of the annexation, support for the Ukrainian 
government, sanctions against Russia (and Russian 
countersanctions), related NATO/EU and individual western 
countries’ discourse are certainly among the unifying elements. 
On the other hand, the inner incoherence also appears through 
the same elements. Western sanctions against Russia since 2014 
have proved to be mostly inefficient and have been maintained 
so (Shchetinskaia 2016, Frye 2018). The support to the Ukrainian 
government has been “token” with arguably no influence over 
the balance of power between the two actors. Ukraine has not 
received a MAP from NATO, and no expansion is on the horizon. 
No EU expansion towards Ukraine (or Georgia) is seriously 
foreseen. 
32 Lewis diagnoses the multipolarist volte-face correctly as an attempt for a “new 
geopolitical space from Budapest to Beijing in which the liberal norms of the 
international order are being challenged”, yet without touching the positional and 
systemic intersubjective “determinism” that engenders it. So, the diagnosis’ arguments, 
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The new phase of post-bipolar intersubjectivity thus stresses 
the inconsistencies in the western positions paradoxically by 
imposing coherence upon them. In other words, if the Crimean 
act narrowed the Russian positional horizon and rigidified 
its modality related to the systemic reference in a different 
manner than had been until that moment, it did the same to 
the western positions. However, such a narrowing of positional 
horizons among the western actors did not entirely fit in a 
consistent directionality. 
Conclusion
The multipolarism as Russian modality to refer to the 
unipolar system had not rigidified to the point of positing an 
in-system alternative for the earlier phases of the post-bipolar 
intersubjectivity. Similarly, the unipolarity was referred to in 
“western” positioning only as retention of the self in bipolar-
era with no symmetrical resistance. The new systemic phase 
that retains less the bipolar positioning on “invalidation” and 
passes the retention-protention into a more authentic phase 
on validation (in differing modalities) of unipolarity is likely 
to constitute the phenomenological basis of the new state of 
affairs. Ukrainian crisis and annexation marked the passage 
as content.
Multipolarist volte-face of the new phase underlined 
particularly by the Crimean act narrowed the westerners’ 
positional horizons by narrowing its own. It accentuated the 
divergences, at subjective/intersubjective level of positioning, 
among the western actors. On the other hand, following 
the apparently risky Crimean act, the multipolarist stance 
within the unipolar system has become more coherent. Many 
prominent non-western actors showed limited solidarity with 
Russia, which may be described as constructive abstention on 
the delicate matter of Crimea. A more substantial positional 
– getting – systemic content modification has undoubtedly 
been the gain of momentum in Russian-Chinese strategic 
cooperation (for example, Lanteigne argues that the “Crimean 
shadow” may impede the cooperation especially in security 
matters and Kuhrt and Buranelli stress Chinese preponderance 
potential in this relationship. Recognising the validity of 
those as contents, we think that the synchronised systemic 
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preferably in terms of contents and still not as the existential 
terms:  Lo 2008: 180-183, Lanteigne 2018, Kuhrt and Buranelli 
2017). Moreover, other international “hotspots”, not causally 
related to Russian near-abroad as in previous phases, have 
begun to be more or less balanced against western influences, 
including direct Russian military engagement in the Syrian 
case. 
History does not lack examples of systemic-level changes 
made visible (and not caused) by relatively small-scale incidents 
as contents. Saguntum, Roman ally yet situated south of 
Ebro was one of them. Its fall marked a new phase in that 
intersubjectivity of Roman-Punic dialectic with well-known 
consequences. In a purely objectivised analysis, Saguntum and 
the “new phase” would appear avoidable in innumerable ways. 
On a phenomenological approach though, the inevitability of 
the new phase itself (regardless of a particular content) might 
be assessed through the study of the retentional-protentional 
positioning of the actors following the First Punic War, which 
is not different from the end of the bipolar era. 
In a way, Crimea is a new Saguntum. On the other hand, the 
noetic-noematic processes of actors as regards the positional, as 
well as the systemic temporality, exist independently from that 
particular content. The content itself gains meaning within the 
framework of reality they constitute. 
By extending the analogy towards the contents, it would not 
be wrong to state that Carthage constitutes itself in a coherent 
position. Roman unipolarity, however, has been struggling to 
preserve First Punic War-level coherence with its Italian allies 
within the new phase of systemic temporality marked by 
Saguntum’s fall.
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